

FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 3 • JULY–SEPTEMBER 2017

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4





Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



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Throughout the report, references to Kosovo* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

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The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

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List of abbreviations used

ATS	amphetamine-type stimulants
BCP	border-crossing point
CIRCA	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
EDF	European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICONet	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
ID	Identification document
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JO	Joint Operation
MAOC-N	Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics
MS	Member State
n.a.	not available
Q/Qtr	quarter of the year
RAU	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
SE	South Eastern
SAR	search and rescue
SAC	Schengen Associated Countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland)
SIS	Schengen Information System
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD	United States dollar
US	United States of America

Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU's external borders, based on the irregular migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterly is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first – to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second – to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore, some of the more detailed data and trends

in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities of Member State border-control authorities undertaken to secure different border sections and widespread variation in reporting and data-collection practices.

FRAN members and Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary audience of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and actively encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, some minor errors may occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines and the growing volume and complexity of the data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.

Starting with the 2015 Q1 issue, the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit has implemented a number of changes to present the analysis of migration-related indicators in the

FRAN Quarterly in a more concise and focused way.

The first part provides a **situational overview**, broken down by main areas of work of border-control authorities and police activities related to irregular migration.

■ **Surveillance**, describing and analysing trends in detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs;

■ **Border checks**, describing detections reported during checks at BCPs (people hiding in vehicles or refused entry);

■ **Fraudulent documents**, describing trends and patterns related to document fraud both at the border and within the EU;

■ **Situation in the EU**, examining developments related to: persons applying for asylum and those detected staying illegally, detected facilitators, return decisions and effective returns.

The second thematic part of the report consists of several **featured risk analyses**, examining trends and patterns of irregular migration in a more comprehensive manner. Eventually, it is expected that some of the featured analysis topics would be developed by external contributors (FRAN members, EU agencies and international institutions).

Methodology

The current 37th issue of the FRAN Quarterly is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between July and September 2017 and exchanged among 31 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network. The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly changes of eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information, such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and therefore are not repeated here.

The FRAN data exchange has been in place since September 2008. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an interest group of the European Commission's CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a country template pre-

pared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 20th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end-of-year data, which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 37th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 20 October 2017. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with a comprehensive analysis.

In January 2012, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDFRAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud at the external borders and on all international flights. The data were backdated and merged with those exchanged under a pilot Tailored Risk Analysis released in 2011.

At the beginning of 2014, Member States started to regularly collect quantitative information on indicators related to secondary movements. In addition, in July 2014,

Frontex organised workshops for Member State experts to gather their expertise and analyse available data. Their input was essential for the analysis of intra-EU/Schengen secondary movements of undocumented migrants.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between Schengen Associated Countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the United Kingdom and Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries (SAC) as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate be-

tween extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under categories of 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices: nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (biweekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation) were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.

Acknowledgements

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express its gratitude to all FRAN and EDF-RAN members and their associates in Member State statistical, migration and document-fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, also to the analysts who compile the bimonthly analytical reports, on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.


I. SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW

Table 1. **Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs**
Detections reported by routes and top three nationalities at the external borders

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
Central Mediterranean route	51 450	61 825	49 408	24 296	59 475	21 660	-65	-64	43
Nigeria	8 458	15 280	10 383	3 160	10 963	2 982	-80	-73	11
Tunisia	225	374	466	156	424	2 065	452	387	7.4
Mali	2 583	3 022	2 958	1 141	3 648	1 673	-45	-54	6
Other	40 184	43 149	35 601	19 839	44 440	14 940	-65	-66	53
Eastern Mediterranean route	8 804	10 500	9 006	6 058	7 408	15 337	46	107	31
Sea	7 067	8 764	7 284	4 928	5 897	12 824	46	117	58
Syria	2 345	2 616	2 212	1 770	2 015	5 568	113	176	25
Iraq	751	965	1 007	427	857	2 891	200	237	13
Afghanistan	1 150	1 122	852	273	394	1 615	44	310	7.3
Other	2 821	4 061	3 213	2 458	2 631	2 750	-32	4.5	12
Land	1 737	1 736	1 722	1 130	1 511	2 513	45	66	11
Turkey	20	47	101	109	183	869	<i>n.a.</i>	375	3.9
Syria	462	569	772	473	467	816	43	75	3.7
Iraq	150	289	192	84	151	409	42	171	1.9
Other	1 105	831	657	464	710	419	-50	-41	1.9
Western Mediterranean route	1 994	2 987	3 601	3 352	4 200	6 668	123	59	13
Sea	1 878	2 757	2 699	2 352	4 035	5 848	112	45	27
Morocco	92	265	306	127	782	2 258	752	189	10
Algeria	139	800	739	115	329	1 160	45	253	5.3
Côte d'Ivoire	485	455	460	680	918	678	49	-26	3.1
Other	1 162	1 237	1 194	1 430	2 006	1 752	42	-13	8
Land	116	230	902	1 000	165	820	257	397	3.7
Syria	0	0	0	0	0	239	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	1.1
Guinea	44	81	450	455	41	152	88	271	0.7
Algeria	0	0	2	0	0	74	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	0.3
Other	72	149	450	545	124	355	138	186	1.6
Western Balkan route	11 102	5 889	4 621	3 507	2 224	3 874	-34	74	7.8
Pakistan	1 796	1 233	1 208	915	767	1 703	38	122	6.1
Afghanistan	5 386	2 245	1 896	1 211	319	1 286	-43	303	4.6
Kosovo*	163	262	160	236	165	292	11	77	1
Other	3 757	2 149	1 357	1 145	973	593	-72	-39	2.1
Circular route from Albania to Greece	1 402	1 111	1 258	1 539	1 657	1 658	49	0.1	3.3
Albania	1 389	1 044	1 219	1 493	1 610	1 621	55	0.7	5.8
Turkey	1	0	0	2	4	9	<i>n.a.</i>	125	0
Kosovo*	0	3	3	3	0	7	133	<i>n.a.</i>	0
Other	12	64	36	41	43	21	-67	-51	0.1
Black Sea route	0	1	0	0	0	472	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	0.9
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	435	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	1.6
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	35	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	0.1
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	1	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	0
Other	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	<i>n.a.</i>	0
Eastern Borders route	370	449	317	143	179	266	-41	49	0.5
Vietnam	137	142	84	27	53	98	-31	85	0.4
Ukraine	32	54	24	19	29	34	-37	17	0.1
Russia	34	36	26	21	12	29	-19	142	0.1
Other	167	217	183	76	85	105	-52	24	0.4
Western African route	168	144	197	74	39	20	-86	-49	0
Algeria	1	0	0	5	0	0	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Not specified	0	66	0	0	0	11	-83	<i>n.a.</i>	0
Morocco	7	14	73	7	39	9	-36	-77	0
Other	160	64	124	62	0	0	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	
Other	0	0	1	0	1	0	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Russia	0	0	1	0	0	0	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	1	0	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	
Total	75 290	82 906	68 409	38 969	75 183	49 955	-39.75%	-33.56%	100%

Source: FRAN data as of 21 November 2017

FRAN indicators



Situation Q3 2017

In the third quarter of 2017, the overall number of detected illegal border-crossings at the EU's external borders fell, which runs counter to the typical quarterly trend. The magnitude of this decrease is highlighted by comparison with the previous quarter (-34%), and the same quarter of 2016 (-40%). It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the overall migratory pressure at the external borders of the EU has been easing, as all major routes actually registered higher numbers, except for one. The slump in the overall number resulted from a strong fall in detections of migrants arriving in Italy on the Central Mediterranean route, which was only partially compensated by increases on all other major routes. Indeed, the strongest increases in absolute numbers were those on the Eastern Mediterranean (+7 929) and the Western Mediterranean (+2 468) route.

The Central Mediterranean route experienced a noticeable turnaround in Q3 2017, falling to almost one-third of registered detections seen in Q2 2017 showing the lowest number of irregular migrants since the first quarter of 2015. For the first time since the EU-Turkey statement was implemented, the registered numbers on the Central Mediterranean route for August and September fell below those on the Eastern Mediterranean. Whereas the number of migrants arriving in Italy from Libya fell, there were more departures from Algeria and, even more so, from Tunisia (from 295 in Q2 2017 to 1 901 in Q3 2017). As a result, irregular migrants from certain Maghreb states (Tunisia and Algeria) increased their share in the flow.

On the Western Mediterranean route, Moroccans and Algerians made up almost

the entirety of the strong increase in the flow (97% of the increase of 2 468 vis-à-vis Q2 2017) to yet another all-time high observed on this route. The 6 668 irregular migrants apprehended represent a relative increase of 123% compared with one year ago, sustained by increases on both the land (+257%) and the sea (+112%) route. A comparison of the number of West Africans registered on this route suggests that a large-scale shift from the Central to the Western Mediterranean route has not occurred.


On the Eastern Mediterranean route, the migratory flow more than doubled in relation to Q2 2017. The 46% increase compared with the same quarter of 2016 was due to both strong increases on the sea (+46%) and on the land (+45%) route. In particular, increases were seen for Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans and Turks. Similarly, on the Western Balkan route, a 74% rise in detections compared with Q2 2017 occurred, fuelled mostly by increased numbers of detected Pakistani and Afghan citizens crossing the EU's external border for the second time.

Finally, the Black Sea route was temporarily used in Q3. Five large fishing boats, launched in Turkey, were intercepted carrying a total of 472 migrants, 435 of which were Iraqis.

Compared with Q3 2016, all FRAN indicators showed decreases. Apart from the fall in illegal border-crossings, the most visible decrease was observed in the number of refusals of entry. However, it was mostly the effect of over 30 000 fewer refusals being issued to Russian citizens, which masked increased refusals for almost all other nationalities.

Trend

Monthly trends, January 2013 to September 2017




Surveillance

Routes

Detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU's external borders, Q3 2017

49 955 →
(82 906) →

Number in parenthesis is for Q3 2016



Q3 data show a decrease in detections of illegal border-crossing, not only compared with Q2 2017 but also in relation to Q3 2016. The 49 955 detections are indeed lower than in any other third quarter since 2014. The roughly 34% drop compared with Q2 2017 is linked to the turnaround on the Central Mediterranean route, which despite remaining the dominant route, accounted for a mere one-third of irregular migrants detected in Q2 2017. All other routes (bar the Western African route) recorded increases, which was most visible on the Eastern Mediterranean route. The number of irregular migrants arriving on this route was the highest since the EU-Turkey statement came into force. As a consequence of the strong decline on the Central Mediterranean and the fact that no displacement from the Central to the Western Mediterranean could be discerned yet, the number of African migrants more than halved compared with Q2 2017. This meant a more equal weighting between African (53%) and Asian (41%) migrants, as the number of the latter additionally increased from 17 379 to 20 492.

Marked turnaround in numbers on the Central Mediterranean route

Undoubtedly the most significant development in Q3 2017 was the turnaround in the number of migrants reaching Italy on the Central Mediterranean route (in absolute terms a fall of 37 815 migrants compared with the previous quarter). After steadily increasing till June 2017 (23 532), the numbers in July more than halved (to 11 460), followed by an even stronger relative fall to almost a third of this level in August (3 918).

This means that the share of migrants arriving in the EU through the Central Mediterranean declined from 78% in Q2 2017 to just 44% in Q3 2017. This decline is mostly attributable to developments in Libya. In Q3, the IOM estimated there were between 80 000 and 100 000 migrants in Libya intending to make the crossing at some point. Unrelatedly, more migrants managed to successfully embark boats in Tunisia and Algeria, mostly heading for Sicily and Sardinia, respectively. Likewise the Turkey-Italy maritime corridor remained open to smugglers, even if fewer migrants used it.

In line with the drastic fall in departures from Libya, the numbers of many African nationalities on the Central Mediterranean route fell proportionally. Nigerians remain the most represented nationality on this route, albeit their decrease was directly proportional to the decline in the overall flow from 10 963 in Q2 to 2 982 in Q3 2017. In relative terms, the number of Bangladeshi nationals dropped the most to almost a tenth of the level in Q2 2017. By contrast, the number of Tunisian nationals almost quintupled compared with Q2 2017 as a result of the successful departures from Tunisia. Consequently, Tunisians (with 2 065 detections) became the second most detected nationality on this route. Similarly, the number of Algerians doubled from 425 in Q2 to 867 in Q3 2017.


Increased migratory pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean and on Western Balkan route

On the Eastern Mediterranean route, the almost linear growth from April 2017 onwards continued throughout the second quarter, more than doubling between July (3 412) and September (7 139). However, the fact that the numbers of apprehended ir-

Trend


Quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing, 2015–2017

Number



Nationalities

Main nationalities of illegal border-crossers Q3 2017



regular migrants in the third quarter are the highest since the EU-Turkey statement does not signify a decline in the Turkish authorities' commitment to border management. As regards the sea border, the comparison between preventions of departures, on the one hand, and apprehensions, on the other, shows rather that the overall number of attempts to cross the Eastern Aegean has been constantly growing, which was particularly visible in September. The increasing pressure on the land border, with 2 513 detections of illegal border-crossing, i.e. the highest figure since Q4 2015, and the temporary use of the Black Sea route found reflection in the diminished attractiveness of the route via the Eastern Aegean Islands.

As regards nationalities of migrants detected in the Eastern Mediterranean, Syrians, whose number (6 384) more than doubled in relation to the same period last year, were followed by Iraqis (3 300) and Afghans (1 674). Also in the top five were Turkish nationals (whose number rose from 74 in Q3 2016 to 985) and Pakistanis (falling from 1 903 to 662).

On the Western Balkan route, after four quarters of decreasing detections of irregular border-crossing, the numbers in Q3 2017 increased by 74% compared with Q2 2017. The detections were still mostly made at the borders with Serbia. At the Romanian-Serbian section the detections dropped compared with Q2 2017 but increased at Serbia's borders with Croatia and Hungary, at the latter returning to levels observed before the second quarter's dip.

New record numbers on the Western Mediterranean

The level of migrant detections reported on the Western Mediterranean route in Q3 2017 (6 668) is comparable with annual totals observed in the years before 2014. Also, it should be borne in mind that some migrant vessels went undetected. Most of the increase could be attributed to arrivals on high-capacity boats, which continued to be used to depart from Morocco's western coastline, mostly by Moroccan migrants. Moroccan nationals (with 2 276 detected arrivals in Spain) account for over a third of the flow, followed by Algerians (1 234) and nationals of West African countries. The increasing use of larger rubber dinghies – used

by sub-Saharan migrants – may denote the increasing activity of people smuggling networks, as these migrants are unlikely to have acquired dinghies and the engines used to propel them on their own. Since the beginning of the JO Indalo 2017, around 30% of all Moroccan migrants apprehended were minors and their share has been constantly increasing from merely 5% in 2015.

Developments on other routes


The Black Sea route was temporarily used in Q3 2017: 472 migrants detected represent the highest number of migrants ever detected in the Black Sea since FRAN data collection began and more than double that of the previous record quarter of Q3 2014. The figure is the total number of irregular migrants who managed to cross the Black Sea on five different boats. Each boat carried between 69 and 154 migrants plus facilitators.

Whereas detections and make-up of the flow on the circular route from Albania to Greece were virtually unchanged compared with Q2 2017, activity on the Western African route further declined to just 20 detections in total in Q3. Lastly, the Eastern borders route registered moderate increases.


Border checks

Refusals of entry

Number per border type, Q3 2017
(only values higher than 1000 are stipulated)



Total: 49 952 (76 815)
Number in parenthesis is for Q3 2016



Clandestine entries

Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
(people hiding in vehicles)

Number, Q3 2017

Total: 266 (689)

Number in parenthesis is for Q3 2016



Trend of the total



Member States issued slightly more refusals of entry (+5.4%) than in the previous quarter, which was mostly an effect of the fluctuating number of Russian citizens refused at the Polish land border.

Excluding the Polish land border for a moment, the aggregate number of issued refusals of entry in Q3 2017 stayed almost exactly on par with the number in Q2 2017. The Polish land border continued to be responsible for the largest share of refusals with a share of 39% and in fact increased its share by a further 3%, of which 45% were Russians and 39% Ukrainians. The increases compared with the previous quarter (for the Polish land border and thus for the overall number of refusals) here then were mostly due to Russians (+1 684), Moldovans (+530) and Ukrainians (+380), most of which due to the lack of a valid visa. Of the Member States reporting the highest numbers of refusals, Hungary (+30%) and the United Kingdom (+43%) showed large relative increases compared with Q2 2017,

whereas Italy (-30%) and Spain (-44%) showed the strongest relative decreases. During the reference period, the proportion of refusals of entry per border type was as follows: 34 269 (68%) land borders; 13 045 (26%) air borders; and, 2 638 (5%) sea borders.

At land borders, the 34 269 refusals issued in Q3 2017 represent a 45% decrease compared with one year ago, a result of the aforementioned fluctuating large numbers of Russians, which in this comparison fell by 75%, partially made up for by increases of different relative extents of pretty much all other major nationalities, of which in particular a doubling of Moldovan citizens (from 606 in Q3 2016 to 1 231 in Q3 2017, the latter refusals having occurred to 68% in Poland) stands out. In comparison with both the previous quarter and the quarter one year before, the lack of sufficient means of subsistence and issued alerts as well as a previous stay of over 3 months are the reason of refusal that have experienced significant increases.

At air borders, slight increases (+9.3%) compared with one year ago are put into perspective by the three previous quarters (with much lower passenger flows) of elevated numbers. Interestingly, passengers from the USA were responsible for a solid increase in refusals, a 35% increase in comparison to the previous quarter and a 20% increase compared with last year. 62% of US passengers were refused at the air borders of the United Kingdom, likely most of them students.

At sea borders, the overall number of refusals stayed virtually unchanged compared with the last quarter, but in the comparison to the previous year a 27% increase was registered. Moroccan, Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan passengers were the recipients of the increased numbers of refusals.

Striking fall in clandestine entry detections in both short- and long-term comparison


In Q3 2017, detected clandestine entry attempts by migrants hiding in lorries, trains, ships and other means of transport decreased markedly to 266. The 62%

Illegal stayers on exit


Total: 23 931 (21 844)

Number in parenthesis is for Q3 2016

Number of detections, Q3 2017



Type of border section:



drop from the 696 detections of Q2 2017 were mostly due to drop in detections at the Croatian borders (from 283 to 15 detections), the Italian borders (from 168 to 59) and the Spanish borders (from 168 to 108). Overall, the decrease in detections was roughly proportionate between land and sea borders. In the comparison to the same quarter of 2016, a uniform decrease across border sections in terms of detections of clandestine entries is noticeable. In times of persistent pressure on the external borders, a fall of attempts to enter clandestinely seems somewhat unlikely, therefore this fall in detections may instead suggest that more migrants succeed to enter clandestinely.

Despite decreased detections from 168 in Q2 2017 to 108 in Q3 2017, clandestine entry attempts at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla almost doubled their overall share of registered clandestine entry attempts to make up 41% of the aggregate. Guineans, who were the top nationality registered overall, all were detected at these land borders to Morocco. This is one of several data points pertaining to specific nationalities attempting to enter clandestinely at specific border sections

in high numbers that suggest the involvement of ethnicity-based organised facilitation networks.

Uniformly spread increase in illegal stays on exit leads to highest number of illegal stay on exit in FRAN history

The number of persons detected on exit at BCPs at the EU's external borders without a valid permission to stay increased from 18 374 in Q2 2017 to 23 931 in Q3 2017, an almost 10% increase compared with the same quarter one year earlier. This number represents the highest number of illegal stay detections in the history of FRAN data collection. Whereas the increases were shared by a wide range of Member States, the largest absolute increases in detections of illegal stays compared with the previous quarter were recorded by Germany (+1 634), Hungary (+1 508), Poland (+716) and Greece (+638). The top five countries detecting most illegal stays on exit remained unchanged: Germany (7 320) was followed by Poland (4 490), Hungary (4 463), France (1 670) and Greece (1 177). With 4 685 detected individuals, Ukrainians continued to be the most common nationality of illegal stayers.

Germany's detections – all of them at the air borders – were wide-spread among a variety of nationalities, most interesting amongst them the significant increases in Chinese citizens (from 453 in Q2 2017 to 787 in Q3 2017). The increase in detections of illegal stays on exit in Hungary took place at its land borders (from 2 522 detections in Q3 2016 to 4 450 detections one year later). Much of this increase stemmed from increased registrations of illegal stays on exit at the land border to Serbia (from 685 to 2 481 one year later). Of these and again compared with one year before, 995 additional Serbians returning to their home country were detected, along with 552 additional citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In Poland, the increased detections compared with the previous quarter occurred at the land border to Belarus (from 414 to 790) and to Ukraine (from 2 988 to 3 280), and were mostly registered for citizens of the respective bordering countries. The increases in Greece on the other hand occurred at the air borders and involved the most prevalent nationalities on the Eastern Mediterranean route.

Fraudulent documents



Detections (at external borders)

Number of detected fraudulent documents per Member State, Q3 2017

Direction:



Number:
(only highest values are stipulated)



Increase in document fraud detections in Q3 2017

In Q3 2017, the overall number of document fraud cases reported in the EDF-RAN increased by 11% compared with the last quarter, reaching 5 488 document fraud cases and 6 327 detected fraudulent documents. An over 8% increase was observed compared with Q3 2016. The overall increase in Q3 2017 is, however, composed of two opposing trends. While on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries the number of document fraud detections reached one of its lowest numbers since the beginning of 2013, the number of detections on the secondary movements within the EU/Schengen area reached the second-highest number since the beginning of 2013. The visa-free regime for nationals of Iran, China and India introduced by Serbia may in the future bring more new document fraud detections to the south-east external EU land border with Serbia as well as to air routes connecting to Belgrade. Migrants stranded in Greece have also been

increasingly trying to board intra-Schengen flights with fraudulent documents.

When it comes to the particular nationalities abusing travel documents, there was no change observed regarding the top-reported nationalities. Albanian nationals remained the most-reported despite a 11% decrease recorded in Q3 2017 when compared with the previous quarter. As in previous years, it is expected that the number of Albanians increases again in the last quarter of 2017.

Syrian nationals became the second-most reported nationality in Q3 2017, in particular due to their significant increase on intra-Schengen movements.

Ukrainian nationals' detections decreased by 17% in Q3 2017 vis-à-vis the previous quarter. It is likely that this trend will continue due to the visa-free regime benefiting Ukrainians since 11 June 2017.

Iranian nationals recorded a solid 23% increase in Q3 2017 compared with the pre-

vious quarter. This development is not only caused by increased detections during secondary movements, but also by the increased detections on arrival from third-countries across air and land borders.


Significant increase in document fraud detections on the air routes departing Greece

Compared with the previous quarter, the overall number of detections on secondary movements within the EU/Schengen area increased by more than 20% from 2 669 in Q2 2017 to 3 225 in Q3 2017. Over 37% of the detections on the secondary movements were accounted for by Albanians and Syrians.

The number of users of fraudulent documents attempting to depart Greece bounded for other EU/Schengen countries increased again by more than 76% from 729 in Q2 2017 to 1 285 in Q3 2017. Especially Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans and Iranians formed the biggest group attempting to depart Greece with fraudulent documents. The

Type

Type of fraudulent document detected, by main countries of issuance, Q3 2017




most-favoured destination remains Germany, followed by Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and France. Syrians attempting to depart Greece with fraudulent documents account for almost 38% of the total and the overall number nearly doubled compared with Q2 2017.

The United Kingdom remained the most frequently-named final destination country including secondary movements inside the EU/Schengen area. In Q3 2017, almost 1 000 persons with fraudulent documents were detected on the routes onwards to the United Kingdom. This number is equal to the number reported in Q2 2017.

Nationality of users

Claimed nationality of persons detected with fraudulent documents on entry from third countries, Q3 2017



On entry from third countries, Iranians reached a record high while Ukrainians dropped by one-third

In Q3 2017, 1 660 persons entered the EU/Schengen area from third countries using fraudulent documents. This number is comparable to the number of detections in the previous quarters of 2017, but lower compared with previous years.

At EU level, of the 95 nationalities detected using fraudulent documents to illegally enter the EU or Schengen area from a third country, the most commonly detected were Moroccans (261), Ukrainians (171), Iranians (146), Albanians (66) and Russians (66). Three significant developments were observed in Q3 2017. While the number of Moroccans unsurprisingly and in line

with the enduring upward trend increased, the number of Ukrainians decreased by nearly one-third due to visa liberalisation. Last but not least, the number of Iranians increased from 88 in Q2 2017 to 146 in Q3 2017 to reach the highest recorded number since the beginning of 2013. Iranians were mostly detected on arrival from Iran, Turkey and newly also from Serbia (Iranians newly visa free to Serbia).

As in the previous months, most detections were reported from air routes. The number of document fraud cases from Istanbul Atatürk decreased by 16% compared with the previous quarter. Istanbul Atatürk, however, still remains among the most-reported last departure airports outside the EU/Schengen area.

Situation in the EU

Illegal stayers (excluding data for exit)

Number of detected cases, Q3 2017

(only highest values are stipulated)





Number in parenthesis is for Q3 2016

Facilitators

Number of detected persons, Q3 2017

Lower bars represent the level for Q3 2016



Illegal stay detections roughly unchanged compared with Q2 2017 and still mostly associated with secondary movements of migrants who reached Europe via the Central Mediterranean

Member States reported a total of 87 543 detections of illegal stay in Q2 2017, a figure that excludes the 23 931 detections made on exit at BCPs (see 'Border Checks', p. 14).¹ The fact that the number is roughly unchanged compared with Q2 2017 illustrates the persistence and magnitude of the problem.

The largest share of illegal stay detections continue to be made in a few countries, whose relative share stayed pretty much unchanged compared with the previous quarter. France is followed by Germany, Italy, Austria and Switzerland and these countries together account for almost 69% of the aggregate. The relative increase in detections of illegal stay in France compared with any quarter of 2016

is in particular due to elevated numbers of detected Sudanese (ranging from 270 to 1 614 maximum detections in 2016 and having registered 3 000 detections in Q3 2017, meaning more than two-thirds of all detections of illegal stay in the EU took place in France). Considering that almost 99% of Sudanese migrants were detected on the Central Mediterranean route, the likely path of their secondary movement is self-evident.


The detailed look at Sudanese migrants is exemplary. Considering the location, among other factors, the high share of detections in the top five countries suggests itself to be the spillover effect of secondary movements of migrants who entered the EU/Schengen area on the Central Mediterranean route. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the breakdown of the nationalities of illegal stayers – reported by the countries where illegal stay detections are most prevalent – matches the relative shares of nationalities reported on this route. For example, 40 330 migrants detected for illegal stay in Q3 2017 (which constituted 46% of the overall number of detections) were nationals of African countries. They, in turn, accounted for over half

of all migrants detected for illegal stay in France. An even higher share of African illegal stayers were recorded in Switzerland. Italy, the primary country of disembarkation despite a strong fall in arrivals, reported a share of African illegal stayers of almost 80% of the total.

Increase in detections of Asian nationals compensated by lower numbers of European and American nationals


Whilst the overall number of detections of illegal stay vis-à-vis Q2 2017 stayed almost unchanged, the composition thereof in terms of nationalities did slightly. Whereas the number of nationals of countries on the African continent remained virtually unchanged, Asian nationals (from 27 731 to 30 013) increased by 8%, in line with strong increases in arrivals of irregular migrants to the EU through the second and third quarter of this year. On the other hand, European nationals registered a decrease in detections (from 14 149 to 12 986) and so did American nationals (from 4 283 to 3 573).

¹ All data on detections of illegal stay in this chapter will consist only of those detections that were not made at BCPs on exit from the EU, because these cases are analysed in the chapter 'Border checks'.



Returns

Nationality of returned people, Q3 2017



Decisions vs. Effective returns, Q3 2017

Number in parenthesis is for Q3 2016



Decreases in Scandinavia and increases in Balkan Member States

The previously observed decreasing trend in Scandinavian Member States continued into the reporting period. Denmark reported even lower numbers in Q3 2017.

The further increase in the number of detections reported by Member States located along the Western Balkan route is probably linked to the continued closure of the Balkan corridor. Romania more than doubled its detections and Bulgaria too registered a sizable increase of 44%. Croatia and Hungary also saw increases.

Fall in detections of facilitators for third quarter in a row

In Q3 2017, Member States reported the arrest of 2 285 facilitators, which represents a decrease of 12% compared with the previous quarters and a decrease of 16% compared with one year ago. Whereas compared with the previous quarter, inland detections decreased from 1 233 to 1 077 and land detections decreased from 853 to 598, detections at sea (from 186 to 248) and air borders (from 59 to 75) increased slightly. The list of the most prevalent nationalities of the arrested facilitators stayed mostly unchanged except for a decrease in

Italian facilitators arrested – a drop from 164 to 94 facilitators between the quarters – leading to a drop on the table. At the same time more Romanians and Syrians were arrested for the provision of facilitation services.

The list of the top countries reporting most arrested facilitators in Q3 2017 stayed almost unchanged, with Spain reporting a decrease and Greece – an increase. Together Italy, France, Spain and Greece still accounted for the bulk (79%) of arrested facilitators, which is hardly surprising given that these are the frontline states most exposed to the strong migratory pressure in the Mediterranean, with the notable exception of France, which is the only country on the list mostly affected by secondary movements. Thus, France conducted more than half of the arrests of facilitators inland.

Despite a small increase in effective returns, ratio of effective returns to return decisions lower than in Q2 2017

In the third quarter of 2017, Member State authorities issued 77 054 return decisions to third-country nationals following an administrative or judicial decision. This number represents an increase of 4 782 (+6.6%) issued return decisions compared with Q2 2017, yet falls short of previous quarters

of last year. Changes in the composition of nationalities receiving return decisions continue to reflect the changing composition of the incoming migratory flow, with different time lags resulting from differences in national procedures. Thus, compared with Q2, absolute increases for Ukrainian citizens (from 7 226 to 8 576) and Iraqi citizens (from 4 557 to 5 267) as well as Syrians (1 821 to 3 078) and Tunisians (1 107 to 2 102) were particularly strong.

As effective returns increased a mere 2.4% compared with Q2 2017 and thus slower than return decisions, the ratio of effective returns to return decisions fell to less than 49%, illustrating the increasing difficulty Member States experience in enforcing returns. Progress seems to be focused on a small group of countries, with (in order of aggregate effective returns) Pakistan (+17% of returns implemented vis-à-vis Q2 2017), Russia (+9.1%), India (+19%), Tunisia (+36%) and Georgia (+14%) standing out in the top ten of countries to which migrants have been effectively returned.

II. FEATURED RISK ANALYSES

Drug trafficking activities with a cross-border maritime dimension

The new Regulation 1624/2016 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency expanded the scope of risk assessment – as an essential component of European Integrated Border Management (IBM) – to encompass the analysis of cross-border crime. The regulation defines cross-border crime as ‘any serious crime with a cross-border dimension committed at or along, or which is related to, the external borders’. This brief overview focuses on drug trafficking activities that have an impact on the EU’s external maritime borders. Even though the analysis is mostly based on information from official reports and open sources, it helps present some of the main challenges from a border surveillance perspective.

Cocaine trafficking

Official seizure statistics show that the majority of cocaine shipments enter Europe via Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium. Overall, it is estimated that

approximately 125 tonnes of the drug worth USD 33 billion are consumed in Europe each year. The largest European cocaine markets are the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany and France, together accounting for 80% of total consumption.

Large cocaine shipments are smuggled directly from Latin America to Europe on transatlantic routes in shipping containers and concealed compartments on various types of vessels. The Calabrian mafia ‘Ndrangheta has a well-established role in the cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe. In recent years, cocaine smuggling networks have been diversifying the routes using transshipment hubs in West Africa (e.g. Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, the Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria) and the Caribbean. The drug is moved by various transportation modes across North African countries to Europe. Significant quantities are smuggled from West Africa via numerous couriers on commercial air flights. Secondary routes for cocaine smuggling to Europe run through South-Eastern Europe and East Africa.

Heroin trafficking

About 80 tonnes of Afghan heroin are smuggled to Western and Central Europe each year through Iran, Turkey and South-Eastern Europe. Important recent developments include the emergence of two new routes via the Southern Caucasus and Syria and Iraq. However, the ‘Balkan route’ – with its northern, southern and western sea/land branches – remains a key corridor for heroin entry into the EU. There is also evidence that Afghan heroin is being processed, re-packaged and stored for export in South-Eastern European countries. Criminal groups based in Balkan countries, especially Albania and



Figure 1. Drug smuggling case within JO Triton

Kosovo*, play a key role in the smuggling of heroin to Europe.

As criminal groups try to use alternative transshipment routes to minimise the risks of interception by law enforcement, heroin is also smuggled from Afghanistan through the so-called 'southern route' – a network of routes stretching from Afghanistan through Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean – to East Africa and then to Europe. Developments on this route suggests that it plays a more significant role in the supply for European markets.

Cannabis trafficking

Herbal cannabis produced in large quantities in South-Eastern Europe is exported to Western and Central Europe via the Adriatic Sea on speedboats and ferries from the Albanian ports of Durres and Vlore or overland through neighbouring Balkan countries. Despite a large-scale crackdown on Albanian cannabis producers at Lazarat village in 2014, the situation remains largely unchanged. The yearly production of about 900 tonnes of cannabis is worth EUR 4.5 billion, which is nearly equivalent to half of Albania's gross domestic product.

Cannabis resin of Moroccan origin is smuggled to Western and Northern European markets by Moroccan drug trafficking networks in cooperation with international organised crime groups (OCGs). Spain is the main entry point to Europe and the principal smuggling method involves the use of speedboats. Cannabis resin is also transported from Morocco to North African countries. Over 100 tonnes of cannabis resin, possibly intended for European markets, have been seized off the coasts of North Africa in recent years, according to the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre-Narcotics (MAOC-N). South-Eastern Europe also represents a secondary route for the smuggling of Moroccan cannabis resin to Europe.

Synthetic drugs trafficking

There is evidence that amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are produced in clandestine laboratories of South-Eastern Europe

to supply international markets, among others, in Europe and the Middle East. In West Africa, there is also evidence of fast-growing ATS production (e.g. methamphetamine laboratories in Nigeria) for international markets in Asia, South Africa and possibly Europe, too. Seizures of amphetamine and methamphetamine have been reported in Niger and other West African countries. The EU itself is a significant supply and consumption area with substantial amount of synthetic drugs produced in clandestine laboratories for European and global markets, mainly in the Netherlands and Belgium.

Frontex joint maritime operations

It is worth noting here the results achieved within the framework of Frontex Joint Operations in the Western and Central Mediterranean Sea. In 2016, 80 tonnes of cannabis resin (hashish), 14 tonnes of cannabis herb (marihuana), 1.74 tonnes of cocaine were detected. By the end of November 2017, 91 tonnes of hashish, 44 tonnes of marijuana, 1.7 tonnes of cocaine and 35 kilograms of heroin have been seized. During these operations, 149 drug smugglers were arrested in 2016 and 200 in 2017 (as of 30 November).

Conclusion

Drug trafficking poses a serious challenge to the security of the EU's external maritime borders. Organised crime groups, motivated by lucrative business opportunities, flexibly exploit all maritime transportation modes to smuggle illicit drugs to European markets. Since their activities are crucial for market supply, it is expected that maritime drug trafficking will continue to evolve, which will have an impact on the external and internal security of the EU.

Admittedly, the trade in narcotics is only a part of the big picture. Cross-border crime is a much broader phenomenon covering various illicit flows (e.g. counterfeit products, cigarettes and firearms), trafficking in human beings and terrorism. Nonetheless, this overview draws attention to the massive scale of illicit drug flows via the maritime domain, the predominant smug-

gling routes and the high profits amassed by criminals.

Countering maritime cross-border crime requires risk-based, intelligence-driven and coordinated operational responses at EU and national level. To achieve this, it is essential to understand better the risks posed by illicit markets and criminal networks ranging from opportunistic to sophisticated and poly-criminal ones. A more nuanced understanding of their maritime trafficking activities will help identify patterns and trends, create risk profiles and determine operational and intelligence priorities. This will go a long way in terms of informing operational targeting and law-enforcement actions. Frontex will conduct risk assessments and deepen its cooperation with Europol and Member States' law-enforcement agencies to help combat all forms of serious cross-border crime.

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Increasing irregular migration pressure from the Maghreb region

Since January 2017, the number of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians reported from the irregular migration routes leading towards Europe has been constantly growing. In the history of FRAN data collection (i.e. since 2007), the monthly number of North Africans detected for illegal border-crossing was only higher in March 2011, during the Arab Spring, and in November 2015, at the peak of the migration crisis. In Q3 2017, 7 965 persons of these three Maghreb nationalities were reported from the EU's external borders, which represents an increase of 69% compared with the previous quarter and of 116% in relation to Q3 2016.

The vast majority of irregular migrants from North Africa entered the EU on boats along the Western and Central Mediterranean routes, and – to a lesser extent – through the Eastern Mediterranean. A closer analysis, however, reveals substantial differences in the patterns of movement between the three nationalities.

In spite of increases, irregular migration of Algerians more regional than national phenomenon

Detections of Algerians at the EU's external borders more than doubled between Q2 and Q3 2017, reaching almost 2 300 illegal border-crossings, i.e. the highest level since the Arab Spring. The increased flow was first reported from the Spanish sea borders in June and July 2017, and by August it had also transpired in the Central Mediterranean. Notwithstanding the sharp increase in the irregular migration flow of Algerians in the Mediterranean, in Q3 2017, this flow represented only 5% of the total. The fact that the vast majority of Algerian nationals departing towards Italy come from the province of Annaba would

suggest a regional migration issue rather than a national phenomenon.

'Push' and 'pull' factors remained the same as in previous years. The main reasons for emigration mentioned by interviewed migrants who left the country towards Italy were: socio-economic hardship, lack of perspectives, claimed prosecution for political and religious reasons by the Algerian authorities and lack of returns from the EU to Algeria.


The intra-EU secondary movements reported by Member States clearly point to a route from Italy to France, with a branch from Spain being less visible. However, the strong increase in Algerian nationals reported from the EU's external sea borders was not reflected in the trend in detections of illegal stay, which only grew by 2% between the second and third quarter of 2017.

With almost 2 000 applications in Q3 2017, a number comparable with the previous quarter, the share of Algerians seeking for asylum in the EU is relatively high, in spite of a first-instance asylum rejection rate of more than 90%. Around one-third of the applications is reported by France.

Most North African irregular migrants from Morocco

For the last 12 months, Moroccans showed to be the main North African nationality responsible for irregular migration pressure. With 3 527 illegal border-crossings in Q3, the number of Moroccan arrivals was 8% higher than in the previous quarter and 166% higher than one year ago. FRAN data clearly show that the Central Mediterranean was the route of choice for Moroccans to reach the EU.

Figure 2. Irregular migration and returns of Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians



Source: FRAN data

Migrants from Morocco reportedly use two different routes to reach Libya, both running through Tunisia. In order to enter Tunisia, Moroccan nationals typically use either work visas or personal invitations. The first route involves air travel from Casablanca to Tunis and then overland journey to the border with Libya. The second route also involves Moroccan migrants travelling by air, but this time, from Casablanca to Mitigia airport transiting via Tunis.

Traditionally, Moroccan migrants see Libya as an alternative route to the direct route to Spain, where the bilateral agreement with Morocco enables the Spanish authorities to return irregular Moroccan migrants within a relatively short period of time. However, in Q3 2017, the preferential route of Moroccans changed, resulting in the highest number of Moroccans detected at the Spanish sea border since FRAN data collection began in 2007.

The most common *modus operandi* used by Moroccan migrants in the Western Mediterranean is crossing the Strait of Gibraltar aboard toy boats or inflatable rubber boats. Nevertheless, they are constantly searching for faster and more secure ways to reach the Spanish coast undetected, due to the fact that, in the event of apprehension, they are quickly repatriated. The sharp surge in the summer period was mainly due to a new *modus operandi*, i.e. use of high-capacity boats capable of transferring large groups of migrants from the

Figure 3. Routes of migration of Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians





Figure 4. Aggregate detections of illegal border-crossing by Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians at EU's external borders in July 2016–September 2017



Source: FRAN data

Western Coast of Morocco, mainly departing from Larache and Kenitra.

Until July 2017, Italy had been the country reporting the largest secondary movements of Moroccan migrants, mostly towards France. However, the level of intra-Schengen movements of Moroccans from Italy has fallen since their migratory flows have shifted to the Western Mediterranean route.

Irregular migration flow of Tunisians becoming more intense and more risky

The vast majority of Tunisian irregular migrants try to enter the EU by boat from their own country. In the third quarter of 2017, the number of Tunisians detected in the Central Mediterranean was more than six times higher than in the previous quarter and more than four times higher than one year ago, amounting to almost 2 065 (of the total 2 150 detections of Tunisians). In August and September 2017, the number of migrants per boat increased significantly from an average of 12 in previous months to 24.

Most incidents involved small wooden boats or rubber dinghies that either targeted Pantelleria, Lampedusa or the western coast of Sicily. Some irregular migrants

departing from Tunisia organise their sea crossing on their own by purchasing a rubber dinghy and an outboard engine or by contacting fishermen who take 4-8 migrants aboard their vessels while undertaking fishing activities and drop them off close to Italian territorial waters on a rubber/plastic boat. The migrants then navigate towards the Italian coast.

At the same time, several cases of prevention of departure were reported by the Tunisian authorities. The intensive patrolling activity of the Tunisian authorities was one of the key factors that has prevented larger levels of irregular migration from Tunisia to the EU in the past.

The Tunisian diaspora in traditional destination countries in Europe, such as France or Belgium, shows to be a strong pull factor which affects the secondary irregular migration routes of Tunisians in Europe. The shared language and the close historic relationship between these two francophone countries and Tunisia (e.g. similar system of education) makes them attractive destinations for Tunisians. It is hardly surprising that most Tunisians travelling undocumented in the EU are detected between the most prevalent country of arrival, Italy, and the preferred countries of destination: France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium.

The majority of irregularly arriving Tunisian nationals apparently intends to work illegally rather than to apply for asylum in the EU. The respective Eurostat indicator shows a very low number of 370 first-time asylum applications during Q3 2017 (-11% in relation to Q2 2017), which can be explained by a very high asylum rejection rate of more than 90%.

Irregular migration routes significantly affected by level of return cooperation

The extent of return cooperation, the effectiveness of readmission agreements and Member State return capacities had substantial impact on the volume and routes of irregular migration flows from North Africa.

In conclusion, as the example of these three migrant nationalities shows, a harmonised European return policy would be a crucial element of a joint strategy preventing irregular migration in the long term.

III. STATISTICAL ANNEX

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 21 November 2017,
unless otherwise indicated

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported at the external borders, by border type and top ten nationalities

							2017 Q3		per cent of total
	2016			2017			% change on		
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	year ago	prev. Qtr	
All Borders									
Syria	4 241	4 481	3 784	2 920	3 948	7 132	59	81	14
Iraq	1 993	2 277	2 396	1 118	2 241	4 107	80	83	8.2
Morocco	996	1 328	2 789	1 975	3 271	3 527	166	7.8	7.1
Afghanistan	7 380	3 978	3 086	1 568	859	3 050	-23	255	6.1
Nigeria	8 527	15 339	10 444	3 192	11 002	3 013	-80	-73	6
Pakistan	3 361	4 308	3 348	2 142	3 301	2 792	-35	-15	5.6
Algeria	571	1 951	2 052	876	1 004	2 289	17	128	4.6
Tunisia	246	414	503	190	436	2 149	419	393	4.3
Côte d'Ivoire	4 387	3 868	4 287	3 299	5 806	2 144	-45	-63	4.3
Albania	1 527	1 158	1 353	1 643	1 885	1 975	71	4.8	4
Other	42 061	43 804	34 367	20 046	41 430	17 777	-59	-57	36
Total All Borders	75 290	82 906	68 409	38 969	75 183	49 955	-40	-34	100
Land Borders									
Pakistan	2 119	1 518	1 444	1 068	1 210	1 840	21	52	20
Albania	1 443	1 124	1 313	1 553	1 659	1 685	50	1.6	18
Afghanistan	6 061	2 677	2 144	1 295	392	1 351	-50	245	15
Syria	1 717	1 274	1 156	842	626	1 097	-14	75	12
Turkey	350	186	176	166	265	1 009	442	281	11
Iraq	1 103	852	533	408	592	449	-47	-24	4.9
Kosovo*	163	265	163	239	165	299	13	81	3.3
Guinea	48	87	456	456	44	152	75	245	1.7
Algeria	108	101	113	153	22	111	9.9	405	1.2
Vietnam	144	179	93	33	57	110	-39	93	1.2
Other	1 471	1 152	1 229	1 106	702	1 026	-11	46	11
Total Land Border	14 727	9 415	8 820	7 319	5 734	9 129	-3	59	100
Sea Borders									
Syria	2 524	3 207	2 628	2 078	3 322	6 035	88	82	15
Iraq	890	1 425	1 863	710	1 649	3 658	157	122	9
Morocco	856	1 246	2 773	1 945	3 261	3 480	179	6.7	8.5
Nigeria	8 509	15 332	10 437	3 179	10 988	3 006	-80	-73	7.4
Algeria	463	1 850	1 939	723	982	2 178	18	122	5.3
Tunisia	232	409	494	183	430	2 090	411	386	5.1
Côte d'Ivoire	4 367	3 847	4 221	3 232	5 754	2 085	-46	-64	5.1
Mali	2 624	3 065	3 017	1 160	3 688	1 733	-43	-53	4.2
Guinea	4 337	3 654	4 969	3 488	5 254	1 731	-53	-67	4.2
Afghanistan	1 319	1 301	942	273	467	1 699	31	264	4.2
Other	34 442	38 155	26 306	14 679	33 654	13 131	-66	-61	32
Total Sea Border	60 563	73 491	59 589	31 650	69 449	40 826	-44	-41	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections reported at the external borders, by border type and top ten nationalities

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
Border Type									
Land	372	584	369	438	485	179	-69	-63	67
Sea	68	105	154	128	211	87	-17	-59	33
Top Ten Nationalities									
Guinea	112	86	90	94	109	31	-64	-72	12
Iraq	34	17	91	53	80	30	76	-63	11
Algeria	10	26	25	24	22	27	3.8	23	10
Syria	134	304	125	48	14	25	-92	79	9.4
Afghanistan	33	102	59	196	269	20	-80	-93	7.5
Albania	28	30	16	8	38	13	-57	-66	4.9
Turkey	4	11	13	6	14	12	9.1	-14	4.5
Tunisia	16	20	11	10	9	12	-40	33	4.5
Sierra Leone	1	2	5	0	1	11	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	4.1
Guinea-Bissau	0	2	1	0	1	11	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	4.1
Other	68	89	87	127	139	74	-17	-47	28
Total	440	689	523	566	696	266	-61	-62	100

Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported at the external borders, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on	prev. Qtr	
							year ago		
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 744	1 129	1 314	1 235	1 233	1 077	-4.6	-13	47
Land	210	532	800	956	853	598	12	-30	26
Sea	214	227	171	312	186	248	9.3	33	11
Land Intra EU	159	179	397	208	198	203	13	2.5	8.9
Not specified	1 195	597	534	76	58	84	-86	45	3.7
Air	53	58	83	66	59	75	29	27	3.3
Top Ten Nationalities									
Not specified	644	506	529	298	130	250	-51	92	11
Morocco	313	255	341	330	176	153	-40	-13	6.7
Albania	148	164	258	192	162	122	-26	-25	5.3
Romania	122	63	60	105	75	114	81	52	5
Syria	42	85	101	55	71	99	16	39	4.3
Italy	203	65	106	141	164	94	45	-43	4.1
France	175	97	92	116	129	91	-6.2	-29	4
Pakistan	112	75	75	75	102	91	21	-11	4
Spain	170	141	122	129	170	88	-38	-48	3.9
Turkey	49	42	69	70	52	73	74	40	3.2
Other	1 597	1 229	1 546	1 342	1 356	1 110	-9.7	-18	49
Total	3 575	2 722	3 299	2 853	2 587	2 285	-16	-12	100

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported at the external borders and inland, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on	prev. Qtr	
							year ago		
Place of detection									
Inland	97 047	106 896	97 448	89 036	87 218	87 546	-18	0.4	79
Air	12 281	13 391	12 645	10 998	10 647	13 557	1.2	27	12
Land	5 054	6 680	7 253	5 292	6 581	8 789	32	34	7.9
Land Intra EU	1 478	1 602	1 726	1 118	977	1 328	-17	36	1.2
Sea	161	171	158	132	169	254	49	50	0.2
Between BCPs	598	:	:	:	:	:	<i>n.a</i>	<i>n.a</i>	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Ukraine	6 642	8 068	9 091	7 275	8 014	7 933	-1.7	-1	7.1
Morocco	6 732	6 938	7 317	8 395	8 019	6 950	0.2	-13	6.2
Iraq	6 671	5 850	6 308	5 191	3 948	6 264	7.1	59	5.6
Albania	4 771	6 430	7 975	6 417	6 136	5 825	-9.4	-5.1	5.2
Pakistan	5 201	4 895	4 769	4 637	5 098	5 411	11	6.1	4.9
Afghanistan	14 306	11 946	8 359	5 447	5 507	5 306	-56	-3.6	4.8
Algeria	3 849	4 255	4 532	4 811	4 302	4 387	3.1	2	3.9
Sudan	1 997	2 935	1 691	1 607	3 789	4 132	41	9.1	3.7
Nigeria	3 408	4 222	3 937	3 826	3 616	3 763	-11	4.1	3.4
Syria	7 129	5 999	4 496	3 087	3 294	3 686	-39	12	3.3
Other	55 913	67 202	60 755	55 883	53 869	57 817	-14	7.3	52
Total	116 619	128 740	119 230	106 576	105 592	111 474	-13	5.6	100

Since July 2016 detections 'between BCPs' are no longer available accordance with new template for Illegal stay indicator.

Annex Table 5. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry reported at the external borders, by border type and top ten nationalities

							2017 Q3		
	2016			2017			% change on		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	year ago	prev. Qtr	
All Borders									
Russia	18 591	41 540	14 758	7 720	8 802	10 656	-74	21	21
Ukraine	6 733	7 944	6 956	8 518	9 055	9 712	22	7.3	19
Albania	4 715	4 851	6 426	7 910	9 041	7 442	53	-18	15
Serbia	1 634	1 759	1 568	1 816	1 783	2 349	34	32	4.7
Belarus	1 222	1 525	1 869	1 609	1 849	1 929	26	4.3	3.9
Moldova	1 000	932	1 195	1 298	1 308	1 651	77	26	3.3
Turkey	641	1 227	870	1 008	1 208	1 383	13	14	2.8
Morocco	1 208	917	860	1 130	956	1 058	15	11	2.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 387	806	931	967	920	966	20	5	1.9
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	407	570	485	590	540	810	42	50	1.6
Other	14 169	14 744	18 191	12 446	11 931	11 996	-19	0.5	24
Total All Borders	51 707	76 815	54 109	45 012	47 393	49 952	-35	5.4	100
Land Borders									
Russia	18 291	41 165	14 393	7 439	8 363	10 175	-75	22	30
Ukraine	6 372	7 566	6 558	8 132	8 589	9 220	22	7.3	27
Albania	2 871	3 078	2 879	3 999	5 400	5 100	66	-5.6	15
Serbia	1 409	1 567	1 341	1 518	1 471	1 988	27	35	5.8
Belarus	1 187	1 472	1 819	1 565	1 794	1 856	26	3.5	5.4
Moldova	638	606	829	802	741	1 231	103	66	3.6
Turkey	345	774	533	690	774	910	18	18	2.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 315	754	867	907	838	847	12	1.1	2.5
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	293	451	324	451	384	623	38	62	1.8
Georgia	389	394	326	196	256	390	-1	52	1.1
Other	5 383	4 975	8 220	2 716	1 740	1 929	-61	11	5.6
Total Land Border	38 493	62 802	38 089	28 415	30 350	34 269	-45	13	100
Air Borders									
Albania	1 050	947	2 142	2 206	2 121	1 378	46	-35	11
Brazil	927	839	1 097	927	857	711	-15	-17	5.5
United States	398	434	344	402	384	520	20	35	4
Ukraine	333	352	386	381	430	471	34	9.5	3.6
Russia	289	353	326	259	422	467	32	11	3.6
Moldova	359	324	365	494	567	420	30	-26	3.2
Georgia	80	111	108	119	389	409	268	5.1	3.1
China	338	362	290	402	323	365	0.8	13	2.8
Not specified	316	295	351	336	353	358	21	1.4	2.7
Morocco	277	249	281	326	308	354	42	15	2.7
Other	7 286	7 671	8 128	8 034	8 253	7 592	-1	-8	5.8
Total Air Border	11 653	11 937	13 818	13 886	14 407	13 045	9.3	-9.5	100
Sea Borders									
Albania	794	826	1 405	1 705	1 520	964	17	-37	37
Morocco	246	278	228	482	440	559	101	27	21
Turkey	70	171	49	45	93	152	-11	63	5.8
Syria	30	87	25	31	34	113	30	232	4.3
Not specified	33	21	20	18	21	98	367	367	3.7
Iraq	17	62	66	27	40	85	37	113	3.2
Afghanistan	32	42	42	46	66	73	74	11	2.8
Algeria	26	29	14	34	55	52	79	-5.5	2
Iran	17	30	18	10	28	32	6.7	14	1.2
Tunisia	49	53	31	26	35	30	-43	-14	1.1
Other	247	477	304	287	304	480	0.6	58	1.8
Total Sea Border	1 561	2 076	2 202	2 711	2 636	2 638	27	0.1	100

Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reason for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2017 Q3 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Russia	10 656	21	2	9 454	6	379	85	215	61	381	64	10 668
Ukraine	9 712	33	37	2 253	2	4 009	524	1 054	752	19	1 029	9 712
Albania	7 442	36	47	62	5	2 108	490	2 141	1 966	43	225	7 123
Serbia	2 349	22	16	104	3	252	1 014	206	686	10	20	2 333
Belarus	1 929	19	0	655	0	254	103	398	43	202	267	1 941
Moldova	1 651	3	4	168	0	523	127	639	119	3	27	1 613
Turkey	1 383	173	13	774	6	126	203	32	30	6	18	1 381
Morocco	1 058	39	22	176	20	561	20	59	75	38	42	1 052
Bosnia and Herzegovina	966	134	2	7	3	222	65	174	343	5	3	958
Georgia	799	0	1	49	3	450	2	76	144	6	72	803
Other	12 007	886	233	2 912	155	2 317	574	806	663	134	3 219	1
Total	49 952	1 366	377	16 614	203	11 201	3 207	5 800	4 882	847	4 986	49 483

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.

Annex Table 7. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders, by reason for refusal and border type

							2017 Q3			Highest share
	2016			2017			% change on		per cent of total	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	year ago	prev. Qtr		
All Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	25 323	52 125	22 899	14 035	14 366	16 614	-68	16	34	Russia (57%)
E) No justification	9 973	8 959	12 680	14 111	14 186	11 201	25	-21	23	Ukraine (36%)
G) No subsistence	3 428	3 645	6 604	4 376	5 516	5 800	59	5.1	12	Albania (37%)
Reason not available	5 927	3 583	3 819	3 441	3 759	4 986	39	33	10	Ukraine (21%)
H) Alert issued	2 684	3 091	3 744	3 917	4 461	4 882	58	9.4	9.9	Albania (40%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 722	2 326	2 359	2 989	2 706	3 207	38	19	6.5	Serbia (32%)
A) No valid document	1 488	1 521	1 161	1 327	1 532	1 366	-10	-11	2.8	Turkey (13%)
I) Threat	791	827	874	886	963	847	2.4	-12	1.7	Russia (45%)
B) False document	282	342	508	401	475	377	10	-21	0.8	Albania (12%)
D) False visa	187	212	244	232	227	203	-4.2	-11	0.4	India (11%)
Total All Borders	51 805	76 631	54 892	45 715	48 191	49 483	-35	2.7	100	
Land Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	23 012	49 286	20 364	11 574	11 713	13 865	-72	18	40	Russia (66%)
E) No justification	5 276	4 779	6 761	7 503	7 795	7 026	47	-9.9	20	Ukraine (55%)
G) No subsistence	2 305	2 536	4 954	2 722	4 067	4 515	78	11	13	Albania (45%)
H) Alert issued	1 668	1 979	1 945	1 866	2 270	3 553	80	57	10	Albania (37%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 254	1 768	1 732	2 294	2 019	2 590	46	28	7.5	Serbia (37%)
Reason not available	3 449	1 051	1 085	1 146	1 183	1 426	36	21	4.2	Ukraine (67%)
I) Threat	571	644	651	656	732	641	-0.5	-12	1.9	Russia (56%)
A) No valid document	902	684	438	563	558	604	-12	8.2	1.8	Afghanistan (25%)
B) False document	54	74	144	84	92	102	38	11	0.3	Ukraine (35%)
D) False visa	42	33	65	64	28	28	-15	0	0.1	India (32%)
Total Land Border	38 533	62 834	38 139	28 472	30 457	34 350	-45	13	100	
Air Borders										Nationality
E) No justification	4 301	3 755	5 415	5 818	5 546	3 464	-7.7	-38	27	Albania (14%)
Reason not available	2 288	2 408	2 492	2 162	2 381	2 921	21	23	23	United States (12%)
C) No valid visa	2 138	2 554	2 387	2 337	2 437	2 461	-3.6	1	19	Russia (10%)
G) No subsistence	869	921	1 336	1 353	1 353	1 249	36	-7.7	9.8	Albania (9%)
H) Alert issued	661	611	1 050	995	1 205	897	47	-26	7	Albania (31%)
A) No valid document	466	362	545	537	784	583	61	-26	4.6	Not specified (25%)
F) Over 3 month stay	442	523	602	657	625	555	6.1	-11	4.4	Albania (17%)
B) False document	208	254	356	305	364	264	3.9	-27	2.1	Not specified (13%)
I) Threat	194	165	198	204	206	182	10	-12	1.4	Albania (16%)
D) False visa	141	168	168	160	196	156	-7.1	-20	1.2	Pakistan (9%)
Total Air Border	11 708	11 721	14 549	14 528	15 097	12 732	8.6	-16	100	
Sea Borders										Nationality
E) No justification	396	425	504	790	845	711	67	-16	30	Morocco (62%)
Reason not available	190	124	242	133	195	639	415	228	27	Albania (11%)
H) Alert issued	355	501	749	1 056	986	432	-14	-56	18	Albania (88%)
C) No valid visa	173	285	148	124	216	288	1.1	33	12	Turkey (20%)
A) No valid document	120	475	178	227	190	179	-62	-5.8	7.5	Turkey (37%)
F) Over 3 month stay	26	35	25	38	62	62	77	0	2.6	Albania (61%)
G) No subsistence	254	188	314	301	96	36	-81	-63	1.5	Albania (39%)
I) Threat	26	18	25	26	25	24	33	-4	1	Albania (50%)
D) False visa	4	11	11	8	3	19	73	n.a.	0.8	Not specified (42%)
B) False document	20	14	8	12	19	11	-21	-42	0.5	Morocco (45%)
Total Sea Border	1 564	2 076	2 204	2 715	2 637	2 401	16	-8.9	100	

Annex Table 8. Document fraud

Fraudulent document users detected on entry from third countries, by border type and top ten nationalities

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
Border Type									
Air	955	1 182	1 124	980	1 123	1 034	-13	-7.9	62
Land	607	566	475	532	480	402	-29	-16	24
Sea	58	115	118	80	77	224	95	191	13
Not specified	0	0	0	23	1	0	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	
Top Ten Nationalities Claimed									
Morocco	142	223	219	202	147	261	17	78	16
Ukraine	339	326	196	250	252	171	-48	-32	10
Iran	92	95	115	57	88	146	54	66	8.8
Not specified	158	172	149	128	146	125	-27	-14	7.5
Albania	94	67	138	110	81	66	-1.5	-19	4
Russia	39	39	41	83	52	66	69	27	4
Turkey	36	52	50	44	65	65	25	0	3.9
Syria	52	55	60	41	48	63	15	31	3.8
Iraq	47	113	63	38	35	38	-66	8.6	2.3
Senegal	25	35	20	20	41	37	5.7	-9.8	2.2
Other	596	686	666	642	726	622	-9.3	-14	37
Total	1 620	1 863	1 717	1 615	1 681	1 660	-11	-1.2	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Annex Table 9. Document fraud

False documents detected on entry from third country to the EU or Schengen area, by type of document

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
Document Type									
Passports	611	701	712	656	782	675	-3.7	-14	34
ID cards	268	281	371	299	311	352	25	13	18
Visas	502	629	404	465	459	428	-32	-6.8	22
Residence permits	258	318	302	298	282	285	-10	1.1	14
Stamps	195	223	218	183	179	171	-23	-4.5	8.7
Other	46	41	64	61	56	62	51	11	3.1
Total	1 880	2 193	2 071	1 962	2 069	1 973	-10	-4.6	100

Annex Table 10. Return decisions issued

Return decisions issued, by top ten nationalities

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Ukraine	5 954	6 582	7 713	6 459	7 226	8 576	30	19	11
Morocco	5 509	5 336	5 819	5 356	6 913	6 191	16	-10	8
Iraq	6 579	7 350	8 720	5 079	4 557	5 267	-28	16	6.8
Albania	4 132	4 367	5 086	4 176	4 537	4 464	2.2	-1.6	5.8
Afghanistan	8 728	8 774	10 232	6 440	5 036	4 185	-52	-17	5.4
Pakistan	3 340	4 368	3 915	3 696	3 607	4 168	-4.6	16	5.4
Syria	1 800	2 272	3 548	1 914	1 821	3 078	35	69	4
Algeria	1 874	2 651	3 273	2 185	2 377	2 903	9.5	22	3.8
Tunisia	1 038	1 204	1 517	1 079	1 107	2 102	75	90	2.7
India	2 148	1 898	1 999	1 924	1 746	1 818	-4.2	4.1	2.4
Other	32 732	33 869	34 103	30 637	33 345	34 302	1.3	2.9	45
Total	73 834	78 671	85 925	68 945	72 272	77 054	-2.1	6.6	100

Annex Table 11. Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries, by top ten nationalities

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Albania	6 897	6 509	6 852	6 323	6 638	6 249	-4	-5.9	17
Ukraine	4 859	5 836	6 607	4 873	6 240	6 127	5	-1.8	16
Pakistan	1 734	1 184	1 371	2 078	1 452	1 697	43	17	4.5
Morocco	2 166	1 803	1 663	1 631	1 612	1 442	-20	-11	3.8
Russia	914	992	927	1 068	1 202	1 311	32	9.1	3.5
Iraq	3 407	2 328	2 167	1 945	1 280	1 223	-47	-4.5	3.3
India	2 505	1 336	1 309	1 588	1 008	1 203	-10	19	3.2
Tunisia	707	679	1 043	669	774	1 052	55	36	2.8
Serbia	1 914	1 630	1 467	1 327	1 176	1 042	-36	-11	2.8
Georgia	588	670	720	729	845	965	44	14	2.6
Other	20 770	16 855	17 787	17 832	14 396	15 198	-9.8	5.6	41
Total	46 461	39 822	41 913	40 063	36 623	37 509	-5.8	2.4	100

Since October 2015 data for Austria are not available.

Annex Table 12. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries, by to type of return and top ten nationalities

TYPE OF RETURN	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total	Highest share	Nationality
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on				
							year ago	prev. Qtr			
Forced	21 435	19 583	20 307	18 882	18 287	18 894	-3.5	3.3	50		
Enforced by Member State	15 748	14 134	15 886	14 381	14 437	15 491	9.6	7.3	41		United Kingdom (24%)
Not specified	4 116	3 693	3 386	3 083	3 016	2 812	-24	-6.8	7.5		Netherlands (44%)
Enforced by Joint Operation	1 571	1 756	1 035	1 418	834	591	-66	-29	1.6		Germany (88%)
Voluntary	24 993	20 231	21 518	20 976	18 295	18 538	-8.4	1.3	49		
Others	15 883	12 360	15 240	13 991	13 013	13 292	7.5	2.1	36		Poland (43%)
IOM-assisted	5 821	6 719	4 870	5 870	4 155	4 374	-35	5.3	12		Greece (34%)
Not specified	3 289	1 152	1 408	1 115	1 127	872	-24	-23	2.3		Netherlands (70%)
Not specified	33	8	88	205	41	77	863	88	0.2		
Total	46 461	39 822	41 913	40 063	36 623	37 509	-5.8	2.4	100		
Top Ten Nationalities											
Voluntary											
Ukraine	4 351	5 306	5 987	4 402	5 519	5 538	4.4	0.3	30		
Pakistan	1 068	812	944	1 460	983	1 151	42	17	6.2		
Iraq	3 226	1 742	1 930	1 734	1 084	1 046	-40	-3.5	5.6		
Russia	681	760	576	719	798	936	23	17	5		
Albania	1 407	1 226	1 225	1 130	1 018	921	-25	-9.5	5		
India	2 181	948	904	1 201	668	800	-16	20	4.3		
Moldova	268	371	494	407	449	628	69	40	3.4		
Georgia	302	332	391	447	496	562	69	13	3		
Afghanistan	1 465	1 048	937	1 016	579	432	-59	-25	2.3		
Belarus	256	333	292	263	299	422	27	41	2.3		
Other	9 788	7 353	7 838	8 197	6 402	6 102	-17	-4.7	33		
Total Voluntary Returns	24 993	20 231	21 518	20 976	18 295	18 538	-8.4	1.3	100		
Forced											
Albania	5 471	5 279	5 591	5 182	5 603	5 310	0.6	-5.2	28		
Morocco	1 885	1 642	1 486	1 378	1 192	1 190	-28	-0.2	6.3		
Tunisia	623	635	988	598	702	990	56	41	5.2		
Serbia	1 308	1 061	816	806	786	772	-27	-1.8	4.1		
Kosovo*	1 293	1 384	919	834	668	608	-56	-9	3.2		
Ukraine	507	530	620	471	721	586	11	-19	3.1		
Pakistan	666	372	427	618	469	546	47	16	2.9		
Algeria	658	585	592	691	575	533	-8.9	-7.3	2.8		
United States	378	351	341	331	208	441	26	112	2.3		
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	547	391	397	332	431	439	12	1.9	2.3		
Other	8 099	7 353	8 130	7 641	6 932	7 479	1.7	7.9	40		
Total Forced Returns	21 435	19 583	20 307	18 882	18 287	18 894	-3.5	3.3	100		

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 13. **Passenger flow on entry**

Passenger flow reported at the external borders, by border type and group of nationalities

	2016			2017			2017 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
Border Type									
Air	39 424 006	49 336 400	38 346 824	33 511 447	39 859 247	54 446 516	10	37	58
Land	24 966 971	34 558 469	24 979 444	23 021 240	28 331 290	35 465 122	2.6	25	38
Sea	5 383 035	7 986 795	3 017 360	2 040 773	4 313 445	4 181 697	-48	-3.1	4.4
Nationality									
Not specified	47 499 753	60 489 692	43 650 662	35 162 159	43 324 173	57 694 318	-4.6	33	61
EU	12 448 972	19 756 131	12 238 250	11 314 528	15 181 274	20 421 390	3.4	35	22
Third country requiring visa	8 127 838	9 465 170	8 741 198	10 377 955	11 675 787	13 326 417	41	14	14
Third country not requiring visa	1 697 449	2 170 671	1 713 518	1 718 818	2 322 748	2 651 210	22	14	2.8
Total	69 774 012	91 881 664	66 343 628	58 573 460	72 503 982	94 093 335	2.4	30	100

Data for Cyprus are not available for July and August 2017

Data for Czech Republic are not available for September 2017

Data for France are not available since June 2017

Data for Portugal are not available since June 2016

Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data concerning all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked countries including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain, and in Greece (these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A). Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data concerning the apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data concerning detections on exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders of Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the United Kingdom, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

The data on return decisions issued (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not available for Ireland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The data on effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7B) are not available for Ireland. In addition, the data of effective returns are not disaggregated by return operation (voluntary and forced) for Spain. The data on voluntary effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (IOM-assisted and others) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands. The data on forced effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7B) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (enforced by Member States and by Joint Operations) for Belgium, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands.



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